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Waiting for Hippocrates: 
The "Right to Die" and 
the U.S. Constitution 
by 
Mr. Carl A. Anderson 
The author is Dean, John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family, 
Washington, D. c., and Vice President for Public Policy, Knights of Columbus 
On March 6, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
decided the case of Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington. 1 In doing so, it 
became the first federal circuit court of appeals to decide a "right-to-die" case and 
to find that such a "right" was protected by the United States Constitution. Soon 
thereafter, on April 2, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided the case of Quill v. Vacco. The court in that case also found that 
physician-assisted suicide by terminally ill patients was protected by the 
Constitution.2 Parties in both cases announced their intention to seek review of 
these federal court decision by the United States Supreme Court. This article will 
provide a brief exposition and analysis of the issues considered in both cases. 
Compassion in Dying v. State 
Compassion in Dying v. State involved a challenge to the Washington State law 
which makes assisting suicide a crime punishable. by imprisonment of up to five 
years and a fine of up to $10,000. The law states that "a person is guilty of 
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowlingly causes or aids another person to 
attempt suicide."3 The circuit court concluded "that there is a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's own death" 
(p. 1). Moreover, the court ruled that insofar as a state law "prohibits physicians 
from prescribing life-ending medication for use by terminally ill, competent 
adults who wish to hasten their own deaths" such a statute violates the United 
States Constitution and is therefore invalid (p.. 1). Should the circuit court 
decision stand it will have extraordinary influence within the United States. Since 
the Ninth Circuit includes the states of California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, 
Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii its ruling will affect approximately 
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a quarter of the population of the United States. On March 25, the Attorney 
General for the State of Washington announced her intention to appeal the 
court's decision to the United States Supreme Court. 
The challenge to the Washington law was brought by eight plaintiffs: four 
physicians who treat terminally ill patients, three terminally ill patients and a 
non-profit organization called Compassion in Dying. The three terminally ill 
patients involved in the case are 'Jane", "John", and "James". "Jane" is a 
69-year-old retired physician who has suffered since 1988 from cancer which has 
now metastasized throughout her skeleton. "Jane" is completely bedridden and 
the only medical treatment available to her is medication which cannot fully 
alleviate her pain. "John" is a 44-year-old artist dying of AIDS. The court noted 
that "John" is "especially cognizant" of the suffering imposed by a lingering 
terminal illness because he was the primary caregiver for his long-time 
companion who died of AIDS in 1991. "James" is a 69-year-old retired sales 
representative who suffers from emphysema which causes him a constant 
sensation of suffocating and heart failure related to his pulmonary disease. In 
addition to the plaintiffs, various organizations also filed briefs in support of the 
challenge to the law including Americans for Death with Dignity, American 
Civil Liberties Union, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, AIDS 
Action Council, and American Humanist Association. Organizations that filed 
briefs in defense of the law included United States Catholic Conference, Catholic 
Health Association, Americans United for Life, and Washington State Hospital 
Association. 
In beginning its analysis, the court observed: "In examining whether a liberty 
interest exists in determining the time and manner of one's death, we begin with 
the compelling similarities between right-to-die cases and abortion cases. In the 
former as in the latter, the relative strength of the competing interests changes as 
physical, medical, or related circumstances vary. In right-to-die cases the 
outcome of the balancing test may differ at different points along the life cycle as a 
person's physical or medical condition deteriorates, just as in abortion cases the 
permissibility of restrictive state legislation may vary with the progression of the 
pregnancy. Equally important, both types of cases raise issues of life and death, 
and both arouse similar religious and moral concerns. Both also present basic 
questions about an individual's right of choice" (p. 7). After noting the similarities 
between the "right-to-die" and abortion, the court stated that "in deciding 
right-to-die cases, we are guided by the [U.S. Supreme] Court's approach to the 
abortion cases" (p. 8) and in particular, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in its 
most recent abortion case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 4 
However, before the circuit court began its analysis of the "right-to-die" in 
light of the abortion jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it first defended its 
formulation of the legal issue to be resolved. The circuit court stated, "While 
some people refer to the liberty interest implicated in right-to-die cases as a liberty 
interest in committing suicide, we do not describe it that way. We use the broader 
and more accurate terms, 'the right to die,' 'determining the time and manner of 
one's death,' and 'hastening one's death' for an important reason. The liberty 
interest we examine encompasses a whole range of acts that are generally not 
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considered to constitute 'suicide.' Included within the liberty interest we examine, 
is for example, the act of refusing or terminating unwanted medical treatment" 
(p. 9). Indeed, the level of generality chosen by the court in defining the question 
to be addressed was not simply important in resolving the issue of whether the 
"right-to-die" is a liberty interest protected by the Constitution, but was actually 
outcome determinative of the question. As one commentator on American 
constitutional law has written, "Insofar as the right of personhood is limited to 
liberties long revered as fundamental in our society, it makes all the difference in 
the world what level of generality one employs to test the pedigree of an asserted 
liberty claim."5 In other words, this commentator continued, "It is crucial, in 
asking whether an alleged right forms part of a traditional liberty, to define the 
liberty at a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional variants to 
claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected conduct."6 
The recurring issue confronting the United States Supreme Court and all lower 
federal courts is what standard to apply in determining whether a particular 
activity is protected within the scope of the liberty specified by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.7 In attempting to ascertain 
whether an activity should be classified as a "fundamental liberty" and therefore 
protected from state prohibition or infringement, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the interest to be protected must be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if[ such liberties] were sacrificed" 
and "where they are characterized as those liberties that are deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition."8 Like the "right to abortion", the "right to die" is 
nowhere to be found in the United States Constitution. To the contrary, for most 
of the constitutional history of the United States, states not only refused to 
recognize such activity as a "right", but the state governments imposed criminal 
penalties on those involved in such activity. Thus, if the conduct is narrowly 
defined, that is, defined so as to limit the description of the so-called "liberty" 
interest to the conduct at issue and to no other more generally accepted conduct, 
then it is very difficult to regard the conduct as a "liberty" since it traditionally has 
been criminalized by the state. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court rejected such a close 
historical context for the definition of the liberty interest at issue. The Supreme 
Court stated, "It is ... tempting ... to suppose that the [Constitution] protects only 
those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against 
government interference by other rules oflaw when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified ... But such a view would be inconsistent with our la w. It is a promise 
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government 
may not enter."9 The circuit court quoted this language with approval in 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington and went on to observe that had the 
Supreme Court not taken such a broad view of what constitutes liberty, "it would 
not have held that women have a right to have an abortion [since] as the dissent 
pointed out in Roe v. Wade, more than three-quarters of the existing states (at 
least 28 out of 37 states); as well as eight territorial legislatures restricted or 
prohibited abortions in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted" (p. 
13). 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence was found to be 
persuasive in another important aspect. The Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood Y. Casey re-affirmed the constitutional right to abortion. It did so by 
replacing the notion of "privacy" as the constitutional principle which 
encompassed a "right" to abortion with a broad, seemingly open-ended concept 
of liberty. After reviewing its decisions related to marriage, contraception, 
abortion, family relationships and child rearing, the Supreme Court stated, 
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State."JO 
The circuit court found this analysis broad enough to extend beyond the issue 
of abortion and include the "right to die." According to the circuit court, "the 
decision how and when to die is one of 'the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime,' a choice 'central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.' A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly the full measure 
of his life, has a strong liberty interest in choosing a dignified and humane death 
rather than being reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of 
helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a person dies not only 
determines the nature of the final period of his existence, but in many cases, the 
enduring memories held by those who love him" (p. 19). 
In holding that a "right to die" is protected by the Constitution, the circuit 
court also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cruzan Y. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health. JJ In Cruzan, the parents of a young 
woman in a persistent vegetative state sought a court order entitling them to 
terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures the hospital was 
providing to their daughter. The Supreme Court observed that while "a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment," 12 and that therefore "the United States 
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition"13 the question was not automatically 
resolved in favor of the parents' request. The Supreme Court noted that "an 
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to 
exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' 
must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate."14 The State of 
Missouri had recognized in its law that a surrogate may act on behalf of a patient 
to refuse or terminate life-prolonging hydration and nutrition, but the state had 
required that the surrogate's action must conform to the wishes of the patient. In 
addition, the law required that the surrogate show by "clear and convincing" 
evidence that such was the wish of the patient. Thus, in Cruzan the Supreme 
Court limited its ruling to the question of whether such a procedural requirement 
of the state was an infringement upon the patient's constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving treatment. The Court held that such a high evidentiary 
standard did not violate the Constitution. 
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Although in Cruzan the Supreme Court ruled only on the narrow issue of 
whether the state's evidentiary standard to ascertain the patients' desire to 
terminate treatment was unconstitutionally strict, the: dissenting and concurring 
opinions of justices raised issues that would resurfaoe in Compassion in Dying. 
Dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun (all strongly supportive of 
the constitutional right to abortion announced by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Roe v. Wade) argued that Missouri's evidentiary standard was 
unconstitutional because it amounted to an "obsllacle to the exercise of a 
fundamental right."IS They maintained that "the only state interest asserted here 
is a general interest in the preservation of life. But the State has no legitimate 
general interest in someone's life, completely abstracted from the interest of the 
person living that life, that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical 
treatment. The regulation of constitutionally prote<:ted decisions . .. must be 
predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice 
the individual has made ... Thus, the State's general interest in life must accede to 
Nancy Cruzan's particularized and intense interest in self-determination in her 
choice of medical treatment. There is simply nothing legitimately within the 
State's purview to be gained by superseding her decision."16 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia directly disputed the contention of the 
dissenting justices that "the state has no legitimate general interest in someone's 
life . .. that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical treatment." 
Justice Scalia insisted that while the dissenter's proposition sounded "moderate 
enough" it could not be "logically" limited to only the circumstances of the 
Cruzan case. He argued that if one agrees with the dissenter's view that the 
general interest ofthe State in protecting life must always yield to the individual's 
particularized and intense interest in self-determination to refuse medical 
treatment, then "he must also believe that the Stae must accede to her 
particularized and intense interest in self-determiniation in her choice whether to 
continue living or to die . .. It seems to me, "Justice Scalia continued, that the 
dissenters' position "ultimately rests upon the proposition that it is none of the 
State's business if a person wants to commit suicide ... But it is not a view 
imposed by our constitutional traditions, in which the power of the State to 
prohibit suicide is unquestionable."I? 
In Compassion in Dying, the circuit court held that "the principle that a 
competent person has a constitutionally protected. liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment" articulated by the Supreme Court in Cruzan 
should be applied to the question of physician-assisted suicide (p. 19). With 
virtually no analysis, the circuit court simply announced that "we conclude that 
Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial 
provisio.n of life~sustaining food and water, necessarily recognizes a liberty 
mterest m hastemng one's own death" (p. 20). The circuit court, however, failed 
to explain why this should be so. Nor did the court explain why it is that the 
common law prohibition of suicide existed alongside that of the common law 
right to be free of medical treatment without consent. Both principles reach back 
beyond the American constitutional tradition to the English common law. 
After having asserted a constitutionally protected "liberty interest in hastening 
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one's own death," the circuit court then considered six interests of the state to 
determine whether one or more of those interests outweighed the individual's 
liberty interest. As defined by the circuit court these interests were: "( 1) the state's 
general interest in preserving life; (2) the state's more specific interest in preventing 
suicide; (3) the state's interest in avoiding the involvement of third parties and in 
precluding the use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) the state's interest in 
protecting family members and loved ones; (5) the state's interest in protecting the 
integrity of the medical profession; and (6) the state's interest in avoiding adverse 
consequences that might ensue if the statutory provision at issue is declared 
unconstitutional." The circuit court concluded that in no instance did the state 
interest or any combination of state interests outweigh the individual's "liberty 
interest in hastening one's own death". 
The original three-judge panel which heard the appeal from the federal district 
court decision had upheld the Washington law. Judge Noonan, author of the 
original circuit court opinion, found all of the above state interests to be substantial 
and sufficient to sustain the Washington State law. In particular, Judge Noonan 
found persuasive the Supreme Court's determination in Cruzan that "there can be 
no gainsaying" a state's interest "in the protection and preservation of human 
life".18 Significantly for Judge Noonan, the Supreme Court cited in support of its 
determination that "the majority of States in this country have laws imposing 
criminal penalties on one who assists another in criminal suicide."19 Another 
important state interest enumerated by Judge Noonan was the interest in 
protecting the poor, racial minorities, the handicapped and the elderly from 
exploitation and pressure. In reaching this conclusion Judge Noonan agreed with 
the conclusions of the New York State Task Force on Life and Law report, When 
Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context. The 
Task Force appointed by the Governor of New York in 1984 unanimously 
recommended that New York laws prohibiting assisted suicide and euthanasia 
should not be changed. It concluded that "No matter how carefully any guidelines 
are framed, assisted suicide and euthanasia will be practiced through the prism of 
social inequality and bias that characterizes the delivery of services . . . The 
practices will pose the greatest risks to those who are poor, elderly, members of a 
minority groUp."20 
Perhaps most importantly, the Task Force identified four major factors 
contributing to the clinical background of the medical context regarding 
physician-assisted suicide. First, the Task force found that "Contrary to what 
many believe, the vast majority of individuals who are terminally ill or facing 
severe pain or disability are not suicidal. Moreover, terminally ill patients who do 
desire suicide or euthanasia often suffer from a treatable mental disorder, most 
commonly depression. When these patients receive appropriate treatment for 
depression, they usually abandon the wish to commit suicide." Second, the Task 
Force concluded that "Uncontrolled pain, particularly when accompanied by 
feelings of hopelessness and untreated depression, is a significant contributing 
factor for suicide ... Medications and pain relief techniques now make it possible 
to treat pain effectively for most patients." Third, the Task force determined that 
"Despite the fact that effective treatments are available, severely and terminally 
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ill patients generally do not receive adequate relief from pain." And fourth, the 
Task Force stated the "Numerous barriers contribute to the pervasive inadequacy 
of pain relief and palliative care in current clinical practice, including a lack of 
professional knowledge and training, unjustified fears about physical and 
psychological dependence, poor pain assessment, pharmacy practices, and the 
reluctance of patients and their families to seek pain relief."21 In regard to the 
fourth finding the Task Force noted that "The provision of pain medication is 
legally acceptable even if it may hasten the patient's death, if the medication is 
intended to alleviate pain (pain) not to cause death."22 
However, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected such concerns and instead 
concluded that "even though the protection of life is one of the state's most 
important functions, the state's interest is dramatically diminished if the person it 
seeks to protect is terminally ill ... and has expressed a wish that he be permitted 
to die ... When patients are no longer able to pursue liberty or happiness and do 
not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is clearly 
less compelling" (p. 22). Moreover, the circuit dismissed the concern regarding 
possible exploitation of historically disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, 
handicapped and minorities, saying merely that "The argument that 
disadvantaged persons will receive more medical services than the remainder of 
the population in one, and only one, area - assisted ~uicide - is ludicrous on its 
face" (p. 27). 
Quill v. Vacco 
Quill v Vacco involved a challenge to a New York State statute which provides 
that a person is guilty of manslaughter when "he intentionally ... aids another 
person to commit suicide."23 The Second Circuit Court ruled that state laws 
which deny mentally competent patients who seek to end their lives during the 
final stages of a terminal illness through the assistance of a physician deny such 
patients the equal protection of the laws in violation of the United States 
Constitution. Because the Second Circuit includes the states of New York, 
Connecticut and Vermont, its decision also affects a significant number of 
Americans. The New York law challenged by several physicians and by three 
terminally ill patients: "Jane", a 76-year-old retired physical education instructor 
who was dying of thyroid cancer; George Kingsley, a 48-year-old publishing 
executive suffering from AIDS; and William Barth, a 28-year-old fashion editor 
under treatment for AIDS. Friend of the Court briefs were also filed by many of 
the organizations that filed similar briefs in Compassion in Dying v. State, 
including United States Catholic Conference, American United for Life, Lamda 
Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Association of People with AIDS, 
Americans for Death with Dignity, and Hemlock S.ociety. 
The Second Circuit Court specifically rejected the claim that physician-
assisted suicide was a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. In doing so, the Second Circuit Court's opinion 
could be said to significantly undermine the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's 
decision. The Second Circuit Court observed that '''rights that have no textual 
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support in the language of the Constitution but qualify for heightened judicial 
protection include fundamental liberties so 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty' that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed'" (p. 9). 
The court went on to conclude that "the right contended for here cannot be 
considered so implicit in our understanding of ordered liberty that neither justice 
nor liberty would exist if it were sacrificed. Nor can it be said that the right to 
assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is deeply rooted in the nation's traditions and 
history. Indeed, the very opposite is true. The Common Law of England, as 
received by the American colonies, prohibited suicide and attempted suicide. 
Although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is any longer a crime inthe United 
States, 32 states, including New York, continue to make assisted suicide an 
offense" (p. 10). 
Moreover, the Second Circuit Court continued its different approach than that 
of the Ninth Circuit by finding that New York's criminal prohibition of 
physician-assisted suicide constituted a violation of the equal protection of the 
law. The court stated that this guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment "simply 
requires the states to treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly 
situated" (p. 11). The court arrived at its conclusion invalidating the law through 
a tenous process of generalization, refusing to consider distinctions in the medical 
circumstance among various terminally-ill patients and instead considering all 
terminally-ill patients who sought to "hasten" their death to be "similarly 
situated". The court dismissed any significant difference under the law between 
two types of decisions which the law had always recognized as profoundly 
different; that is, the difference between the decision to refuse or withdraw certain 
medical treatments and the decision to administer death-causing drugs with the 
intention to thereby cause the death of the patient. In doing so, the court ignored 
important distinctions that both medicine and law had traditionally recognized 
and instead generalized that all such decisions would be considered under a single 
category of decisions to "hasten death". 
The court placed great emphasis in its analysis upon the fact that the New York 
legislature in 1990 enacted a new law to allow a person to sign a "health care 
proxy" to appoint an agent with "authority to make any and all health care 
decisions" on the person's behalf including "those relating to the administration 
of artificial nutrition and hydration."24 As a result of the passage of this statute, 
the court ruled that "New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons 
alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems 
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems' but 
those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-
sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering 
prescribed drugs" (p. 16-17). Thus, the court held that there is no legally relevant 
distinction between assisted suicide and the withdrawal or withholding of life-
sustaining medical treatment. 
The court stated, "Indeed, there is nothing 'natural' about causing death by 
means other than the original illness or its complications. The withdrawal of 
hydration brings on death by debyration, and the withdrawal of ventilation 
brings about respiration failure. By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial 
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life-sustaining processes or refusing to accept them in the first place, a patient 
hastens his death that by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly 
cannot be said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the 
progression of the disease or condition from which the patient suffers" (p. 17). 
Whether or not it can be said that the death that ensues is the "natural" result of 
the patient's medical condition, the medical condition is directly related to the 
inability of the patient to perform the function "naturally" that is being provided 
by artificial means. That is a circumstance of the patient which has always been 
regarded as significant for both medical and legal purposes. Moreover, those who 
justify the termination of such procedures from the standpoint of medical ethics 
do so essentially on the basis that such procedures have become excessively 
burdensome to the patient or have become futile. They are not justified on the 
basis that they are necessary to hasten the death of the patient. Thus, the court was 
only able to reach its conclusion by overturning distinctions which both medicine 
and law have historically recognized as vital. 
Moreover the court in Quill v. Vacca misconstrUte<i the nature of the liberty 
interest involved in the right to refuse medical treatment by failing to appreciate 
the relationship of such a right to the principle of bodily integrity ... Suicide 
enjoys no such foundational support, however. When one acts to end one's life, it 
is the intrusion of the lethal agent that violates bodily integrity."25 The New York 
State Task Force on Life and the Law reached a similar conclusion when it found 
that, "The imposition oflife-sustaining medical treatment against a patient's will 
requires a direct invasion of bodily integrity and, in some cases, the use of 
physical restraints, both of which are flatly inconsistent with society's basic 
conception of personal dignity . . . It is this right against intrusion - not a general 
right to control the timing and manner of death - that forms the basis of the 
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment."26 
Finally, the circuit court dismissed the state's interest in protecting human life 
in such circumstances. It stated that "the state's oontention has been that its 
primary interest is in preserving the life of all its citizens at all times and under all 
conditions. But what interest can the state posslibly have in requiring the 
prolongation of a life that is all but ended? Surely, the: state's interest lessens as the 
potential for life diminishes ... What concern prompts the state to interfere with a 
mentally competent patient's 'right to define [his] own concept of existence, of 
meaning, ofthe universe, and of the mystery of human life'" (p.17-18). While it 
is true that the court's language addresses the circumstances of a mentally 
competent patient suffering a terminal illness, it must also be recognized that the 
court's premise, that "the state's interest lessens as the potential for life 
diminishes", is surely one which cannot logically be limited to the situation of 
termi.nal illness or to ~he me~tally competent patient. Certainly, the mentally 
handicapped, the phYSically disabled and the elderly all experience in significant 
ways a "diminishing" in their "potential" for life. Many of these citizens also 
exper~ence a "dimi?ishing" ability to "define [their] own concept of existence, of 
meaOlng, of the UOlverse, and ofthe mystery of human life." To recognize in the 
law a concurrent "lessening" in the state's interest in protecting such life as the 
court does, is a dangerous precedent. ' 
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Conclusion 
Although the circuit courts in both Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. 
Vacco asserted that the physician-assisted suicide of mentally competent, terminally 
ill patients was protected by the United States Constitution, the fact that both courts 
reached this conclusion through different and potentially contradictory rationales 
highlights the tenuous link between suicide and the protections of American 
constitutional law. The equal protection of the law rationale used in Quill v. Vacco 
appears to rest almost entirely upon the circuit court's strained approach to the 
realities of medical care at the end of life by ignoring the very real distinctions 
between decisions to withdraw burdensome or futile procedures and affirmative 
actions undertaken with the intention of killing the patient. One cannot expect that 
such judicial reasoning can endure over time - constitutional law, like the practice 
of medicine, is dependent upon specificity and the recognition of difference, not the 
reverse. 
The rationale of the circuit courts in both cases regarding the interest of the state 
in protecting human life is considerably more troublesome from the standpoint of 
constitutional law. Both courts seem to have accepted the contention of the 
dissenting Supreme Court justices in Cruzan that the state's general interest in life 
must accede to the patient's particularized interest. Such a view suggests that the 
state's interest in protecting life is controlling only when unnecessary; that is, only 
when there is no conflict between the interest of the state and the desire of the 
individual. At other times, when there is a conflict, the individual interest in 
choosing death must be recognized as paramount. Both courts also suggested that 
the interest of the state in protecting life exists only according to some type of 
sliding-scale: the state's interest in life is regulated by the patient's potential for life. 
When the patient's potential for life dimishes so also must the state's interest in the 
protection of that life diminish. For most of American constitutional history, 
however, American society has viewed the right to life as "inalienable." One 
difficulty presented by the courts' opinions in these cases is that if the right to life is 
now held to be "alienable" by the individual who "possesses" the right, it is also 
logically "alienable" by others and may one day be so in fact. Couple this dramatic 
shift in the law with the corresponding weakening of the state's interest in preserving 
life and American society may be set adrift on dangerous seas. 
The United States Supreme Court may still avoid this difficulty by refusing to 
extend the reach of constitutional protections to physician-assisted suicide. As 
one commentator has observed, "A Court that refused to 'constitutionalize' a 
'right to die' broad enough to uphold the claims of the Cruzan family is hardly 
likely to 'constitutionalize' a right to assisted suicide."27 In that regard it is 
significant that the Supreme Court's opinion in Cruzan specifically cited the 
existence of state laws prohibiting assisted suicide as evidence of the state's 
longstanding interest in the protection of human life. Moreover, all eight justices 
were silent regarding any purported "right" to suicide within the factual 
circumstances presented by the medical situation of Nancy Cruzan in the face of 
Justice Scalia's assertion that "there is no significant support for the claim that a 
right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' 
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or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'." 
Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vacco both entirely overlook two 
important realities constitutive of the practice of medicine in the United States 
today: one is psychological and the other is economic. 
The first reality has been known for some time by physicians and can be 
summarized as follows: "A request for hastened death may be a way of saying that 
one does not feel worthy of great attention from the family ... The request for 
euthanasia or assisted suicide may also be a means for patients to ask whether they 
continue to be valued, and whether the burden of illness remains manageable and 
the tasks of care meaningful. Helping patients to die quickly in such a situation does 
not represent a recognition of their autonomy; it simply confirms their sense of 
worthlessness and abandonment."28 To establish a new assisted right-to-die in this 
context may only serve to further enhance this sense of diminished self-worth. 
The second reality involves the economics of medicine at the end oflife. In the 
United States the government-sponsored health program for the elderly, Medicare, 
consistently experiences large expenditures for patients at the end of life. Studies 
have shown that between 27 to 30 percent of payments for medical services under 
the Medicare program are to the five to six percent of Medicare patients who die in 
that year. For example, in 1988, the mean Medicare payment during the last year of 
a patient's life was $13,316 as compared with $1 ,924 £Jr all other Medicare patients 
- a ratio of nearly seven to one.29 Numerous studi,es have been undertaken to 
estimate the amount of financial savings possible to both government and non-
government health care programs from the greater use of health care proxies 
(advance directives), hospice care and "less aggressive interventions". While such 
estimates vary, one study using 1990 expenditures estimated that between $55 
billion and $109 billion might be saved "from a policy of asking all patients about 
their wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment and incorporating those wishes into 
advanced directive."30 Others maintain that the cost savings to be achieved "by 
reducing the use of aggressive life-sustaining intervention for dying patients" will be 
much less, for example, only 3.3 percent of total national health care expenditures" 
- a percentage estimated to save $29.7 billion in 1993.31 
The present economic context for the delivery of health care services in the 
United States is one in which government increasingly demands substantial cost-
savings in government-financed health care services. At the same time, an 
increasingly important number of American hospitals are abandoning their 
traditional character as not-for-profit, charitable institutions in order to become 
for-profit corporations. In such an economic climate, it cannot be reasonably 
assumed that the incentive of potential cost savings of $29 billion to $109 billion 
coupled with a newly established "right" to physician .. assisted suicide will not invite 
varying levels of exploitation of the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped in the 
name of patient autonomy and death with dignity. 
What is also striking about the reasoning of the courts in Compassion in Dying v. 
State and Quilly v. Vacco is their reliance upon the abortion jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court in its most recent articulation in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In his 
now classic treatise on American law, Justice Benjamin Cardozo observed that a 
judicial principle will tend "to expand itself to the limit of its logic."32 The purported 
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expansion of the abortion "liberty" to mandate a "liberty" interest in physician-
assisted suicide is a tragic example of Card ow's maxim. Yet it was predicted with 
surprising accuracy more than twenty-five years ago by the editors of California 
Medicine, the journal of the California Medical Association, when they wrote, 
"The traditional Western ethic has always placed great emphasis on the intrinsic 
worth and equal value of every human life regardless of its stage or condition ... 
The reverence for each and every human life has also been a keystone of Western 
medicine and is the ethic which has caused physicians to try to preserve, protect, 
repair, prolong, and enhance every human life which comes under their 
surveillance. This traditional ethic is still clearly dominant, but . . . it is being 
eroded at its core and may eventually even be abandoned ... The process of 
eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has already begun. It may be seen 
most clearly in changing attitudes toward human abortion ... The part which 
medicine will playas all this develops is not yet entirely clear. That it will be 
deeply involved is certain. Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes 
toward abortion may well be a prototype of what is to occur . . . One may 
anticipate further development of these roles as the problems of birth control and 
birth selection are extended inevitably to death selection and death control 
whether by the individual or by society ... "33 To say that this "new" ethic has a 
logic within it which makes certain developments inevitable is not to say that the 
ethic itself is inevitable. 
In Compassion in Dying v. State and Quill v. Vaceo, two federal circuit courts 
have sought to enshrine this "new" ethic in the United States Constitution so as to 
control decisions concerning the end of life. It is easy for some at times to view the 
"old" ethic as one primarily derived from Christian or, more specifically, 
Catholic sources and the "new" ethic as derived from "neutral" and "secular" 
sources. Indeed, a significant portion of the circuit court's language in 
Compassion in Dying would suggest just such a view. Yet the emergence of 
Hippocrates and his Oath in the Western tradition of medicine derives entirely 
from non-Christian sources. The Ninth Circuit Court's attempt to banish the 
Hippocratic Oath from such life and death decisions by claiming that it 
"originated in a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and that 
it certainly was not accepted by aU ancient physicians" (p. 31) misconstrues both the 
direction and dynamic of history. Regardless of how many ancient physicians 
immediately agreed with Hippocrates, the Hippocratic Oath became the measure of 
Western medicine for the same reason that democracy and the classical ideal in 
sculpture arose in fifth century Athens - it was the only response which conformed 
to the dignity of the human person as a free and moral SUbject. Margaret Mead 
summarized this dynamic as follows: "Throughout the primitive world the doctor 
and the sorcerer tended to be the same person. He with the power to kill had the 
power to cure, including specially the undoing of his own killing activities. He who 
had the power to cure would necessarily also be able to kill. With the Greeks [the 
Hippocratic Oath] the distinction was made clear. One profession, the followers of 
Asclepias, were to be dedicated completely to life under all circumstances, 
regardless of rank, age, or intellect - the life of a slave, the life of the Emperor, the 
life of a foreign man, the life of a defective child ... [T]his is a priceless always 
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possession which we cannot afford to tarnish, but society always is attempting to 
make the physician a killer."34 Many in the ancient world embraced the teaching of 
Hippocrates because of his affirmation of the moral equality and dignity of his 
patients as human persons. It is for those very reasons that many today are willing to 
wait for him still. 
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